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Essay Review of
The World in the Model and the
Model in the World

John B. Davis
Department of Economics, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Mary Morgan’s new book on models in economics represents the
culmination of more than a decade of research on the subject. She is
certainly one of the most expert and accomplished researchers on the
nature and role of models in economics, and this book provides an
extensive review of the practice of modelling in economics across the
history of the field. Her Models as Mediators, edited volume with
Margaret Morrison (1999), is an influential collection of papers on how
models function in modern science. So, readers in the history and
philosophy of science interested in modelling in economics should find
this book a valuable resource. Whether it answers their questions
about models and resolves debates about the practice of modelling in
economics is another issue. Morgan delimits some of those concerns in
defining her project in a particular way. She speaks as an historian of
economics first and foremost, and largely defers more weighty
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philosophical questions to others. She has two main reasons for doing
so.
The first is methodological. In her estimation, adequate
historical narrative is, as she puts it, ‘messy’. Historians often pursue
linear accounts in the interest of providing a clear and cohesive
understanding of their subject matter. But this comes at the expense
of suppressing events and developments that do not fit their general
story, and for Morgan, this undermines the integrity of that story.
Important details are left out, and differences between cases get
suppressed. Thus, The World in the Model is meant to be a
heterogeneous collection of historical case studies each of which
stands in its own right as an exercise in modelling in economics. “I
have long described [the book] as a kind of travel guide: I present, as
three-star tourist sites, some of the best known, and historically
significant, models in economics, and use each as the basis upon
which to fashion a philosophical commentary about the nature of
modern economics” (xv). That philosophical commentary comes in the
form of a collection of insights but not as a large philosophical
argument about what models are. The book “does not try to give a
definition of models—but it does discuss the qualities that make them
useful in a science” (ibid.).
The second reason Morgan puts history before philosophy is that
her vision of her subject is of “a history of the naturalization of
modelling in economics and a naturalized philosophy of science for
economics” (ibid.). Thus, if The World in the Model does not offer a
large philosophical argument about what models are, it certainly takes
a distinct and strong philosophical position in regard to the
interpretation of the history of economics as a science. Note that, as
she puts it above, the history of economics with respect to modelling is
itself a history of naturalizing its subject, with the outcome being a
naturalized history. The tradition she sees herself contesting is that
which emphasizes normative standards for good scientific explanation
in economics and charts the history of economics in terms of progress
in realizing those standards. Morgan’s view, in contrast, is that the
history of economics has increasingly made the model a natural object
in the sense of an historical product, so that we should only study
models in a naturalized philosophy of science for economics. Her
position, therefore, is not just that history is ‘messy’ and we risk
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getting it wrong when we overlook its richness; it is that this history is
becoming messier in and of itself, and this determines that we must
study it with a naturalized philosophy of science.
This outcome was not, however, an inevitable state of affairs.
Modelling as a reasoning style in economics is a relatively recent
historical development. Though there are precursors of models in the
modern (1700 onward) history of economics—François Quesnay’s late
1750s Tableau Économique is one of the earliest—economists only first
referred to models in the 1930s and began then to make modelling
their main method of investigation—with Jan Tinbergen (a physicist by
training) transferring the term ‘model’ into the field from physics. In
the earlier history, economics was a verbal science of broad
generalizations, a few laws, and much reasoning about economic
relationships. In contrast, the twentieth-century rise of modelling as a
practice has been built around the construction and use of relatively
small, compact mathematical objects subject to ready manipulation.
Their ascendency displaced (or obscured) both verbal reasoning in
economics and general principles and laws as the main object of
scientific achievement. The lesser scale of models, their chameleon
nature made possible by manipulation of their assumptions, and their
mathematical form has left economics with a disparate set of
conceptual episodes, much like different natural species, a conceptual
space in which taxonomy takes precedence over philosophy.
In this naturalized world, the main ‘philosophical’ questions have
a pragmatic character: “How do economists create such research
objects? What exactly is involved in scientific reasoning with such
objects? How does working with such objects tell us anything about
the world? That is: How should we characterize the making, using, and
learning from models as a way of doing science?” (5). Wade Hands in
his Reflection without Rules gives us a good sense of how questions of
this kind have changed from the sorts of questions that philosophers
and methodologists of economics previously asked. Traditionally, they
engaged in a quite normative applied philosophy of science which
borrowed and applied established arguments from natural science to
economics—an “off-the-shelf view of scientific philosophy”. In its
place, we find an inquiry without broad rules in which “our views about
the epistemic order are … inexorably intertwined with our views about
the economic order” (Hands 2001, 7).
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In keeping with this, Morgan nonetheless makes important
philosophical claims about what modelling involves. She takes
modelling to be a distinct ‘epistemic genre’ or style of reasoning which
has acquired its own specific form in economics, and uses the
ambiguity of the term ‘formalization’ (a central concern in the
development of postwar economics) to explain modelling as a twosided activity. One meaning of ‘to formalize’ is to give something form
or shape. But ‘formal’ also contrasts with ‘informal’ and refers to
something being rule bound. These two aspects of modelling thus
correspond to two interconnected aspects of models, their making and
their use, which constitute the two respective halves of the book.
Thus: “models function both as objects to enquire into and as objects
to enquire with. That is, they are objects for investigation in their own
right, and they help the economist-scientist investigate the real-world
economy” (31).
This conception leads Morgan to one of her principal claims.
Anticipating that some might say a dual view of models confuses our
understanding of what models are, she gives a succinct
characterization of the generic activity that model reasoning involves,
at least in economics: using a model involves experiments. Models in
themselves are not experiments but the use of them offers
experiments: “model reasoning … involves a kind of experiment”
(ibid.). More fully, modelling is a two-sided practice of systematically
experimenting with ideas and their ultimate relevance. Consider
models as objects to enquire into. Economists have a variety of
theoretical ideas and conceptions, and they experimentally
(imaginatively?) assemble them together in abbreviated and
disciplined form in their models. But what the effects of these
combinations or these experiments are only gets determined in their
modelling. This reverberates back onto economists’ theoretical
intuitions and leads to new models or experiments. The results can
range from surprising to meaningless. So, overall model making is an
activity, process, or practice that needs to be seen as ever ongoing.
Consider models then as objects to enquire with. While scepticism
about what models tell us about the real world is fair, compacting the
‘world’ or the ‘person’ into a small conceptual space clearly offers
opportunities for inferences about real people and the real world. At
the same time, what we believe we find in the real world is surely
influenced by the model ‘world’ we use as a means of investigation.
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But how we justify scientific inference about the world is hardly a new
problem, and while we may reach agreements about what makes for
valid inference, agreements about particular inferences will always be
subject to dispute. Thus, we can only continue to try to make
inferences about what our models tell us, that is, continue to
experiment with their fit.
Morgan accordingly does not deny there are serious
philosophical issues associated with how the ‘world in the model’
relates to the ‘model in the world’. She does say that modelling brings
together two sides of one practice of investigation which as an ongoing
activity is by nature experimental. Science never ends despite the fact
that it has often been seen as a progressive series of outcomes. If we
rather see it as open-ended process, we get a better idea of why
models are two-sided experiments.
This account of Morgan’s book, however, leaves unaddressed an
important position she takes in regard to models in economics with
respect to the meaning of formalization in economics. Among
economists, formalization is more controversial than it might seem to
non-economists. On the one hand, there is little reason to expect any
less recourse to formal modelling and mathematical reasoning in the
field or any significant return to the verbal forms of explanation that
dominated the subject prior to 1950. On the other hand, economists
also exhibit some ambivalence and uncertainty about what this
transition in forms of reasoning involves, and whether it might leave
economics less able to articulate its theoretical motivations and
grounds for economic policy.
Morgan’s intervention in this regard is to emphasize the story in
the model. For her, narratives matter (217ff). This may sound quaint
and old-fashioned, or somehow at cross-purposes to the impulse to
formalization in economics, but it might also rather be seen as an
important insight about the nature of modelling. After all, what drives
the practice itself? Why do economists create models in the first place?
Essentially, it is because they have questions about their theories and
the world they want to answer, and the process of answering their
questions and then asking new questions is intrinsic to creating and
re-creating models. But nowhere in the mechanics of model making or
model using does this vocabulary of asking and answering questions
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appear. We take it for granted that this lies behind science. But
Morgan sees it as only sensible that we bring what underlies modelling
out into the light of day, otherwise we really fail to understand why
economists model what they model.
Note that there is a bit of a divide between philosophers of
science/economics and methodologists of economics on this subject.
The former look for the philosophy of science issues in economics and
see economics as a means, just like other sciences, for getting at
philosophical issues, which is the end. The latter rather look to
philosophy as a means for getting at issues in economics, which is the
end. That is, the two views are diametrically opposed with regard to
order of importance and strategy of investigation.
Morgan, then, comes down on the side of economic
methodologists on this issue because she believes that you must know
what questions bother economists—irrespective of whether those
questions refer to or can be translated into fundamental questions of
philosophy—if you are to understand economics. So her insistence that
one must see the stories in the model and try to extract the stories
economists are trying to tell represents a conviction about the nature
of economic knowledge. This also underlies her commitment to a
naturalized philosophy of science for economics. Naturalization in
philosophy of science in its basic meaning is associated with the idea
that the forms science takes are best explained naturalistically or as if
they were altogether natural species. But naturalization for Hands
(2001) in economics concerns the intertwining of the epistemic order
and the economic order. The pursuit of economic knowledge flows
from the problems of economics, however mundane or important they
may be. Morgan delivers this message when she tells us narratives
matter.
The mechanics of the making and using of models in economics
is therefore only the visible part of the practice of modelling. The
overlooked part involves tacit understanding and offline talk by
economists (McCloskey 1994) that frames their activities and output.
Morgan demonstrates this admirably in her sixth chapter (“Questions
and Stories: Capturing the Heart of Matters”) where she brings this
conversation and story-telling to the surface in the history of
macroeconomic theory. On the using side of models, she says: “‘How
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do economists use models?’ is, in one sense, easy to answer: They ask
questions with them and tell stories! Or more exactly: They ask
questions, use the resources of the model to demonstrate something,
and tell stories in the process” (217–218).
But then this means that a popular reputation of economics—
that it has become a formalized science and that ordinary language is
a thing of the past—is mistaken. Rather what has occurred is that the
informal side of economics has become even more informal as
conversation rather than text, while the formal side of economics has
become even more formal in its increased scope as the exclusive text
that economists employ. Yet both sides of science remain albeit in
their changed forms.
There are important scientific issues here that can be easy to
miss. One is that the limitations of making inferences from models per
se to the world are misconceived if the background narrative of
questions and answers involved in their making and use is overlooked.
How? If we have weak grounds for saying the model world taken on its
own is sufficient for ‘addressing’ the real world, when we add an
account of what questions the model was meant to answer, we
generate further grounds for saying whether or not the model world is
a credible or plausible means of ‘addressing’ the real world. I say
‘addressing’ because the usual term ‘representing’ gets the relation
between the model world and the real-world wrong. On Morgan’s view,
models are created objects—or ‘working objects’ (Daston and Galison
1992). They are things one does things with or instruments, not
pictures or replicas of the real world.
Another issue is the identity of science. With regard to
economics, there has long been a distinction between the science of
economics and the art of economics (Keynes 1891), where the latter
was typically seen as a lesser, applied activity, value-laden and often
idiosyncratic, and derivative of pure science. But this distinction, which
arguably exists in other sciences as well, does not stand up well in the
light of Morgan’s book. Indeed, she offers a significantly different and
thoughtfully developed vision of science that merits reflection. This
vision is cloaked in her demurrals about The World in the Model being
essentially a history of a heterogeneous collection of case studies. But
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those case studies tell a story which philosophers and historians of
science and economics will find valuable and informative.
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